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9 July 1979

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 1993

CONTENTS	PAGE
EGYPT	
Egypt, France Sign Radio, TV Cooperation Protocol (MENA, 22 Jun 79).....	1
Briefs	
Technical Aid to Egypt	2
Loan From African Development Bank	2
IRAN	
Khuzestan Arabs Continue Their Struggle (Bernard Ullmann; L'EXPRESS, 2 Jun 79).....	3
IRAQ	
Iraq Embroiled in Numerous Regional Struggles (AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT 7 MEMO, 18 Jun 79).....	5
Briefs	
Cement Plant	7
ISRAEL	
Friction Between Knesset and IDF General Staff Said Worsening (MA'ARIV, 20 May 79).....	8
IDF Combat Capability and Military Ethics Discussed (AL HAMISHMAR, May 79).....	10
Likud Increases Estrangement Between Government, Elite (HA'ARETZ, 31 May 79).....	13

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Introduction of Judaism as Subject in Public Education System (HAZOFEH, 31 May 79).....	15
Energy Minister Presses Plan To Conserve Energy (MA'ARIV, 20 May 79).....	22
Critical Housing Shortage Called a Time Bomb (AL HAMISHMAR, 22 May 79).....	25
JORDAN	
Water Shortage Crisis in Amman Discussed (Ziyad al-Shillah; AL-RA'Y, 6 Jun 79).....	28
LIBYA	
Presence of Missing Imam Denied (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 28 May-3 Jun 79).....	32
Briefs New Opposition Paper	35
MOROCCO	
Measures Announced by Prime Minister Criticized (AL-MUHARRIR, 16 May 79).....	36
SUDAN	
French Commercial Involvement in Sudan Increases (LE MONDE, 24 May 79).....	42
PCS Central Committee Member Comments on Sudanese Situation (Muhammad El Nur Interview; FRANCE NOUVELLE, 26 May-1 Jun 79).....	44
SYRIA	
Cargo Transportation Problems Plague Tartus Port ('Ali Zayyud Interview; AL-THAWRAH, 9 May 79).....	49

EGYPT, FRANCE SIGN RADIO, TV COOPERATION PROTOCOL

Cairo MENA in Arabic 2020 GMT 22 Jun 79 NC

[Text] Paris, 22 June--A cooperation protocol was signed in Paris today between the Egyptian radio and television union and the public administration of cultural, scientific and technical relations at the French Foreign Ministry. On the Egyptian side the protocol was signed by Tamadir Tawfiq, director of Egyptian television, and on the French side by the director of the public administration of cultural, scientific and technical relations at the French Foreign Ministry.

The protocol, which is valid for 2 years, provides for the bilateral exchange of radio and television programs and television news clips via artificial satellites, for the exchange of recorded music, songs, folklore and modern music; and for the exchange of expertise in training, technical and cultural assistance in various fields.

Under the protocol, the French side will organize long term and short term training courses for Egyptian radio and television employees.

A separate protocol was also signed today between Radio France and the Egyptian broadcasting service for cooperating in covering important events in both countries; for providing facilities to correspondents from both sides; for exchanging radio productions; and for supplying French programs to the Egyptian radio's European service.

Mrs Tamadir Tawfiq is currently in Paris at the head of an Egyptian information delegation.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

TECHNICAL AID TO EGYPT--India will assist Egypt in rural electrification of that country under a protocol signed between the two countries, reports AIR [All-India Radio]. The protocol which was signed during the recent visit of Energy Minister P. Ramachandran to Egypt also provides for maintenance of thermal power stations in Egypt by Indian experts. Egypt will also send its engineers to India to study technical and managerial aspects of lift irrigation. The two countries will also enter into joint ventures to manufacture electrical equipment. [Text] [Delhi ISI Diplomatic Information Service in English 0843 GMT 25 Jun 79 BK]

LOAN FROM AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK--Cairo, 23 June--The African Development Bank has agreed to give Egypt a new loan for this year of \$9.6 million to finance the purchase of a new unit for the production of polyester fibers at the Egyptian Company for Industrial Silk. This was stated today by Samir Karim, under secretary of the Ministry of Economy, who explained that the bank's board of directors approved the loan in its meeting last night in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Karim said that the loan will be repaid after 13 years with a 4-year period of grace and at 7 percent interest. He also said that the productive capacity of the unit that will be purchased is ten tons of polyester fibers daily. [Text] [Cairo MENA in Arabic 1636 GMT 23 Jun 79 JN]

CSO: 4802

KHUZESTAN ARABS CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2 Jun 79 p 111

[Article by Bernard Ullmann]

[Text] Bloody clashes in Iran's big oil province: one more step in the aggravation of the crisis which affects the West...

This time, it is not only the unity of Iran but economic survival which is at stake. Khuzestan, where bloody confrontations have just broken out between military personnel and "Khomeynists" on the one hand and Iranian "Arabs" of the Sunnite denomination on the other, is the oil province, the only one which still brings in some revenue to a country drained after months of "permanent revolution."

Ayatollah Khomeyni and the weak government of Mehdi Bazargan are no longer alone in their concern. By turning off the gas pumps once again, events in the former "Arabistan," in the southwestern part of Iran, opposite the Iraqi border, will perhaps have direct repercussions on the vacations of Frenchmen and are threatening to aggravate the crisis in the industrialized countries as a whole.

Barricades and White Masks

The conflict has been brewing for weeks. It broke out during the night of Tuesday-Wednesday in Khorramshahr, the big port on the gulf, 1,000 km southwest of Tehran. Suddenly, sailors and commandos launched an attack against the Arab political center, located in the former Consulate of the United States.

The Arab spiritual leader of the province, Sheykh Tahir Khagani, age 71, nearly blind, returned from Qom. In the holy city, he had talked with Ayatollah Khomeyni about the situation in his community (60 percent of the 2 million inhabitants of the province). Apparently without result.

The elderly imam continues to be determined to propose a constitutional referendum directly to the country, without great concern for the aspirations to autonomy of the Arab, Kurdish and Turkish minorities. And Khuzestan's demand for a larger share of the revenues from "its" oil. In a few hours, the city was in flames; barricades sprang up.

Masked in white, armed with G3 rifles or pistols, young members of the "Islamic committees" of Ayatollah Khomeyni came to the aid of these military personnel who had massacred them last year in the name of the shah. In the two camps, a few hours later, several dozens of dead were counted.

A more serious consideration, the fighting was not long in reaching Abadan, 20 km to the south, Abadan where the largest refinery in the world is located, with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day.

Opposing Sheykh Khagani was one of the few general officers of the old regime to escape the purge, Vice Admiral Ahmed Madani. He is combining the duties of provincial governor with those of commander in chief of the navy. He reacted exactly as he would have under the shah, by decreeing a state of emergency and having the crowd fired upon, and by asking Tehran for commando reinforcements.

The stakes are enormous: oil, of course, the present production of which is 4 million barrels per day. And then, the "image" in the Arab world of an Iran which is revolutionary but as unified as that of the shah. The Sheykh Khagani talks about appealing to the UN. The methods and fanaticism of the Ayatollah Khomeyni are increasingly more questioned in Tehran.

A general paralysis of oil production would give all its opponents of the "left" serious arguments for reopening the whole question of its authority.

8143

CSO: 4900

IRAQ EMBROILED IN NUMEROUS REGIONAL STRUGGLES

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT 7 MEMO in English 18 Jun 79 p. 3

[Text] The Iraqi government last week gave voice to a fear which has been haunting it since the Islamic revolution which toppled the Shah of Iran; the official newspaper AL-BATH accused the Iranian authorities of seeking to foment strife in Iraq by stirring up the Shia Muslim majority there. The attack, which followed anti-Iraqi demonstrations in Tehran, included a warning to Iran not to "play with fire", adding: "This game is far more dangerous than you think."

The focus of the newspaper article was Iranian allegations--denied in Baghdad--that Iraqi aircraft had violated Iran's airspace and bombed border villages and that Iraq had permitted arms to be smuggled across the frontier into Iran's Khuzestan province, where dozens of people were killed in recent clashes between Iranian forces and ethnic Arabs. The Iraqis had however maintained a polite silence in the face of the accusations, until the Iranians permitted a demonstration by about 4,000 people in Tehran calling for an Islamic revolution in Iraq.

On the day of the demonstration, Iran's official Pars news agency reported that the Iraqi authorities had placed Ayatollah Sayed Mohamed Baqr Sadr, a prominent Shia religious leader, under house arrest in the southern town of Najaf. Quoting reliable sources, the agency said the Ayatollah had planned to leave Iraq but was instructed by Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, to remain to "protect the holy places" in Najaf, which contains the Shia's most sacred shrines.

The demonstration in Tehran was led by six hooded men who, according to reports from the Iranian capital, were Iraqi dissidents. The demonstrators described Ayatollah Khomeini as leader of the Iraqi as well as the Iranian people and called for death to Iraq's President Ahmed Hassan Baqr and number two, Saddam Hussein.

Any fears that the Iraqi leadership had of Ayatollah Khomeini's intention to export his revolution seemed well grounded after the Ayatollah last week warned the Soviet Union to keep its hands off neighbouring Afghanistan.

"Afghanistan is an Islamic country and its problems should be solved through Islam," Ayatollah Khomeini said in a clear challenge to the pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan's President Nour Mohamed Tarikki. The Ayatollah said he had reports that 50,000 people had been killed in Afghanistan and religious leaders arrested, and added: "If Tarikki continues this he will suffer the same fate as the Shah."

The government of Iran's Premier Mehdi Bazargan appeared reluctant however to be drawn into exporting revolution. It barred a group of 500 Shia Muslims from flying to Libya where, they said, they had been invited by Libyan leader Moamer Qadhafi to establish an Islamic republic. The chief immigration officer at Tehran airport said permission for the flight had been refused because Iran and Libya did not have diplomatic relations; other sources said however that the government resented Libyan newspaper references to "Arabistan", the alternative name for Khuzestan, interpreting this as implicit support for secessionists there.

The Baghdad government meanwhile had trouble on another front. It recalled its ambassador from South Yemen, alleging that South Yemeni troops had fired on the embassy to force the surrender of guards accused of killing an Iraqi professor. The professor, a Communist, was shot dead in Aden two weeks ago. The South Yemeni news agency said five Iraqis had given themselves up to the police after the killing. The Iraqi news agency reported however that the men were arrested after 300 soldiers fired 18,000 rounds of ammunition at the embassy and stormed the building. Other Iraqis were arrested and diplomats led away in handcuffs, the report said.

Iraq has been closely involved in efforts to solve the lingering crisis between the Marxist government in Aden and the conservative North Yemeni regime.

CSO: 4820

IRAQ

BRIEFS

CEMENT PLANT--Tokyo, 7 Jun--Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd and Marubeni Corp, both of Japan, have jointly signed a 20,000-million-yen (91-million-dollar) contract to build an integrated cement plant in Iraq, it was announced today. The two firms said the plant, with annual production capacity of one million tons of cement, will be completed in 1982 at this city, about 180 kilometres (112.5 miles) west of Baghdad. The order came from the state organization of industrial design and construction of Iraq, they said. [Text] [Rangoon THE WORKING PEOPLES DAILY in English 9 Jun 79 p 4]

CSO: 4820

FRICTION BETWEEN KNESSET AND IDF GENERAL STAFF SAID WORSENING

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 20 May 79 p 13

[Article: "Widening Credibility Gap Between the IDF Staff and the Knesset"]

[Text] The credibility gap between the Knesset committee and the IDF general staff is widening. The chief of the general staff Maj Gen Rafael Eytan was the first to publicly express reservations about the leaks emanating from the deliberations of the Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs in the Knesset. He communicated his ire before the MK's in his usual curt and incisive style.

Subsequently there were appearances on television by Knesset members as well as senior officers of the IDF. These followed the report of the state comptroller detailing the helicopter mishaps. The senior officers were justifiably incensed because the Knesset members, after listening to the criticism, did not take the time to listen to the other side.

A few days ago there was an additional uproar following the appearance of the adjutant to the chief of the General Staff Maj Gen Yekuthiel Adam at the meeting of the state comptroller in the Knesset in Jerusalem. It appears that even before the major general returned to his office in Tel Aviv, details that had been revealed at the meeting were being broadcast.

The military personnel present at the meeting expressed their amazement at the manner of the procedures and all that was implied thereby. They stated that at the meeting members of the Knesset stepped outside to chat with journalists. The chairman of the meeting emphasized the fact that it was a closed and secret meeting in the presence of the state comptroller. But subsequently the discussions that took place in the meeting room were publicized.

It is known that the major general was denied an opportunity to express his opinion, to answer questions posed to him and to clarify in detail what steps were taken following the report. He opened with a general survey in order to clarify terms and concepts. The members of the Knesset then posed questions and allegations to him. When the major general began to answer

from prepared written material, the chairman of the committee adjourned the meeting.

During the course of the meeting a member of the Knesset turned to Major General Adam with a question: "What shall I say to my son, who is to be drafted 3 years hence?"

Because of the grossly distorted publicity, MK Shmuel Toledano, the chairman of the state comptroller committee, apologized to the security minister and to the adjutant of the chief of the General Staff Major General Adam. The latter refused to accept the apology. In the IDF staff they are still talking about the hostile atmosphere prevailing at that meeting.

The adjutant to the General Staff intends to make himself scarce with that state comptroller committee until such time as an apology is tendered by the entire membership of the committee and not only by the chairman. He does not feel that he personally was insulted, but rather that the insult was leveled at the entire IDF.

8995

CSO: 4805

IDF COMBAT CAPABILITY AND MILITARY ETHICS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew May 79 p 3

[Article: "State Comptroller Criticizes Lowered Morale in IDF"]

[Text] The findings of the state comptroller's report on the IDF in the Litani Campaign may be classified under a few central headings. By this means we can get an inkling of the present quality of the IDF. Two of these subjects were discussed briefly in the television program "The Headlines."

The allotted time was too short to arrive at a clear image of the IDF as it was depicted in the comptroller's report. But the lack of time was not the only limitation on the discussion. The relative strengths of the critics and the protagonists were not evenly matched. Brig Gen Motti Feld, well versed in hostile confrontations (not only in the military area), attacked the capabilities of the IDF and its image very harshly. Opposing him was Lt Col Shaul Givoli, lacking experience, method and poorly equipped with facts. In his efforts to defend the honor of the IDF, which was being attacked and reviled, he was forced to a defensive corner. Add to all this the biased conduct of the moderator (in not allowing equal time to both participants) a harsh and distorted picture of the IDF was presented, particularly in the areas which were under discussion during the program.

M. Feld described the IDF as an organization which had grown and developed beyond the point where it felt necessary to exercise self-discipline. In his opinion it is hackneyed, lacks imagination and flexibility and is incapable of improvisation. The conduct of the Litani Campaign simply verified this judgment to the point where it could be accepted as the predictable future performance of the army. In the opinion of M. Feld the army could no longer conduct a war like the Six Day War.

In his usual style in confrontations of this type M. Feld assembled a maximum number of facts and reasons and applied them to a narrow range of the question. With this maneuver he hoped to breach the array of arguments assembled by his opponent. The opposition is usually ill-prepared for this destructive later beam type of attack. It casts a strong and painful beam

on a complicated situation but fails to light up the entire area, so that worthy and commendable elements are hidden. Those who do not wish to see with their own two eyes or who are not able are blinded and fail to perceive the entire picture.

A specific part of the IDF was engaged in the Litani Campaign. It could be assumed to be a representative model of the army in some future war. But there is no certainty that the performance in southern Lebanon will be repeated. We know there are superior units in the army. There is the Entebbe action and other actions of this type. These have demonstrated the superb abilities of certain combat units under the most trying and difficult circumstances. Not only do they show a superior and sophisticated skill in planning, but their discipline under fire is admirable. Their flexibility and improvisational capabilities have achieved un hoped for results that were truly noteworthy. But the critics who argue that these are elite units who receive special training to achieve these objectives cannot deny that they are an inseparable part of the IDF. One of the secrets of this superior combat ability in these units is the intense motivation of these combatants. This motivation draws its strength from the complete identification of the individual with the aims of the state, concern over social problems, unqualified readiness for cooperative and unselfish effort and a continuous striving for moral and exemplary conduct. If we were to transmit these values in good measure to other regiments we would be able to raise their achievements and to decrease the number of mistakes and blunders. The 'Golani' brigade composed of ordinary soldiers, regular, is proof of the possibility of attaining this goal. They are characterized by a high degree of motivation and have distinguished themselves by commendable achievements in training and in combat.

M. Feld possesses the intelligence (though only military) of a brigadier general. He could have presented a more balanced picture of the IDF by pointing out positive things and facts. He could have addressed himself comprehensively to the problem and pointed out acceptable methods for solution of the problem. A lack of a balanced judgement is occasionally heard from certain people and officers who in anger at the criticism of and allegations against the IDF hold up to us the elite army units. The concern, criticism or praise of the army should apply to the entire IDF, its regular components and the reserves. The only measure of the army's combat capability is its potential for engaging in war on two fronts at the same time. Only from this perspective can we evaluate and take measures to improve the situation.

One of the astounding facts to come out of the Litani operation was the incidence of looting by soldiers, regimental commanders and officers. The public was disillusioned. The prevailing assumption had been that a limited force operating in a confined area and under the complete command of officers would be prevented from engaging in looting. Another element in this assumption was the certainty of corrective measures when instances of looting occurred in previous wars. A modern and reconstructed army

which is more frequently engaged in exercises under fire than it is in a cruel and senseless war should long since have overcome the incidence of this negative and shameful occurrence. The planners of the military action doubtlessly belived that the high moral standards of the IDF would neutralize the isolated incidents of looting and that it would not reach worrisome proportions. How else can we explain the total indifference of the military police from the very start of the conflict. After the first cases of looting and contraband were exposed, 3 days to 2 weeks elapsed before the military police took action to muzzle criticism and to launch an investigation of the looters.

Clearly M. Feld utilized his tested style of presentation to draw a black and grossly exaggerated picture. He recalled with nostalgia the period when the security minister was firm in his demand for the resignation of a senior and capable officer who had been charged with taking a sack of sugar that did not belong to him. S. Giveoli, who was constrained at this point to clarify and deprecate these incidents, took a defensive line and by so doing entrapped himself. He tried to blunt and soften the ceasing and crushing attack. He explained that looting was present in the IDF in al the wars. The inference was that he wished to convey that looting was a military norm with which we have to come to terms without undue agitation.

A past chief educational officer of the IDF should not have chosen this dubious way of presenting the problem with all its painful implications in order to diminish its gravity as described by M. Feld. Giveoli could have pointed to the various measures taken to grapple with looting, and suggested additional solutions that could be reached in order to eradicate this evil.

Both adversaries in the debate on the two subjects mentioned failed to widen the scope of the problem so as to include the Israeli society's image of the IDF as an influential factor. They confined themselves to the military framework exclusively. This was agreeable to M. Feld. To S. Giveoli it proved a stumbling block and a mistake.

8995
CSO: 4805

LIKUD INCREASES ESTRANGEMENT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, ELITE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 May 79 p 3

[Article: "Divergent Positions of the Communications Authority and the Professional Journalists"]

[Text] A debate took place last evening in the Political Science Department of the Hebrew University on the performance of the Communications Authority. Professor Don Hurvitz expressed misgivings over the course Likud is pursuing in the policies of the Communications Authority. "If Likud continues in this policy it will increase the estrangement between it and the government. Its alienation of the elite may very well lead to its downfall."

The administrator of the Communications Authority, announced before the beginning of the meeting that he would be unable to attend because of family reasons. His advisor Mr Nakdimon Rogal as a result was also absent. One of the participants in the debate Professor Shlomo Aronson defended a significant number of the administrator's positions.

In discussing the professional bias of newspapers and journalists Prof Hurvitz remarked they are concerned with raising the awareness of the public. "Twenty years ago what could have been swept under the rug is today being printed and broadcast. The bias of the press caused them to be antagonistic to the previous regime. They are antagonistic to the present regime in the identical manner. The attempt of the new advisory committee to the Communications Authority and of the new administrator to turn the wheel back will not succeed." Journalists refuse to be dwarfed. Their heroes will not be people like Yitzhaq Shimon but rather like Mordekhay Kirshenbaum.

Dr Yitzhaq Gal-Or head of the Political Science Department added that in the mid-sixties when the Communications Authority was first established there were already many elitist groups with standards of professional integrity who were not necessarily political, e.g. in the IDF, in industry and also in the press. Practically every journalist today if he were forced to choose between his personal bias (political) and his professional integrity would choose to maintain his professional integrity.

Prof Aronson cited among other items the regulation instituted by the British Broadcasting Authority in which broadcasts must be in line with standards acceptable to the wide public and not to the critical standards of their colleagues in the coffee house. The right of the public to know must be weighed against the right of the public not to be exposed to something it finds distasteful, like horror scenes connected with a criminal occurrence. The British Broadcasting Company demands that accepted morals be taken into account. It is forbidden to violate the religious feelings of the listeners and viewers and so forth.

Israeli television, he added came into being as a conglomeration of different components. These were added at various stages of its establishment and activities. It is not clear what professional journalistic skills those responsible for the programming possess. The question applies to the ones in the senior positions as well. It is doubtful whether they are capable of differentiating between professional bias and political bias. It would be wrong as Prof Hurvitz presents the case to knock them all. Otherwise we would have to conclude that the people in television are playing a game. It would be better to assign to each matter and to each individual a proper place. Rules of behavior are necessary and they serve as a measure of perceiving individual bias. The standardization of the regulations would perhaps aid in achieving an academic (professional) system.

8995

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

INTRODUCTION OF JUDAISM AS SUBJECT IN PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 31 May 79 pp 3,10

[Article: "Reactions to the Inclusion of Religion Related Subjects in the Secular Curriculum"]

[Text] "Teacher, I never knew that Judaism contained so much of interest to me."

"Teacher, this material is an exact reflection of me. I see myself."

"Teacher, Judaism is not only something for my grandfather. It is good for me as well."

The speakers are children in the seventh grade in the Tel-Ganim school in Ramat-Gan. They were questioned about the new experimental program for the teaching of Judaism that was initiated this year by the Department of Education and Culture.

Many names and many experiments have been buried. They have failed and disappeared under the rubric of instruction in Judaism in the general educational program. Do we recall for example the concept "Jewish Consciousness"? Do we recall the rumor that even the oral Torah was not being taught in the schools because the teachers lacked the requisite knowledge?

In Nir-Zvi a moshav of new well-to-do families opposite Zrifin the pupils in the seventh grade at the beginning of 5739 stated: "We want to study practical subjects only which will relate to our future needs. We do not want Bible, oral Torah or Judaism. It is a waste of time."

The principal of the local school was stubborn and decided to waste their time on the study of the concept of "joy on the Feast of Tabernacles" or on the concept of "individual dignity" just to mention two of the titles of the study pamphlets. They also started new studies in Judaism. By the end of the second trimester the students commented: "There is something to this. It is very interesting."

When they invited me to come to counsel them and to guide them in the teaching of Judaism I came with a complete arsenal of weapons expecting strong opposition. I, personally am a secularist. My children are even more secular than I am. "Why suddenly Judaism?" Margolit Ron of the Tel-Ganim school asked. "To be truthful I must admit I was in the minority. Most of the teachers accepted the proposals willingly and with enthusiasm. Nevertheless I decided to try and it seems that the class accepted these subjects of repentance, the Feast of Tabernacles, individual prayer, group prayer in the synagogue with sympathy and a degree of pleasure. The subject of phylacteries however encountered difficulties. They do not witness the wearing of phylacteries at home. They never saw anybody using them and consequently were indifferent. At a meeting of the parents at the trimester I told them of the new subject of study. In spite of the fact that most were avowed secularists nobody voiced any opposition. "O.K., good," they all said to me.

Yona Silberman the coordinator of the project and the guidance counselor to Margolit Ron in the teaching of Judaism recalls with a smile: "Margolit was very hostile when we proposed to her to teach Judaism. I explained to her that nobody is forcing her to do anything. If you wish you will teach. If you are against it you will not teach. She was curious. She gave it a try and after the passage of some time said to me: "Is this what you call Judaism? This is so relevant to our lives today. I did not realize."

Yona continued: Another teacher Smodar Herstner also from Ramat-Gan and also one of the minority opposed told me in amazement: Do you know since we began to learn Judaism the discipline problem in the class improved. The children began to behave much better towards one another."

Tzipi Levi is a teacher in the Ra'anana middle school (Ostrovsky): "A week ago I read the newspaper article by Shulamit Aloni in which she protests vehemently against the exclusivity of the Department of Education. In our conversation she said to me with a touch of irony: "I was irritated by the article. Would that she and the other opponents of the program come into the classrooms and speak to the pupils. They would see how much the students and teachers are gaining from the material."

"We have 10 classes of grade 7 (excluding the accelerating class and the slow class) who are learning Judaism. The interest is deep and it is no wonder. Compared to the prior system of teaching oral Torah to grades 7 and 8, the new approach has an aesthetic quality. Suddenly the teachers and pupils together are discovering the beauty in Judaism and its relevance to our daily living."

Yona Silberman is following the experiment closely and warns the Israeli public that there is no religious coercion in the educational program. The attackers like Shulamit Aloni and MK Ora Namir have not fully grasped the concept. They probably see the title of a pamphlet "Repentance" and immediately raise an outcry that the children are being forced to repent. This is incorrect. There is no demand made on the secular children to keep any of

the religious commandments. Even in the pamphlet on the phylacteries the blessings were deleted for fear someone would say we demand the children put on the phylacteries. The intent is to endow the children with the knowledge and with an attitude which will change their own self image as Jews and of their nation as the People of Israel.

When the minister of education and culture Mr Zevulun Hammer took up his post following the changeover he promised or more exactly the Israeli public expected a qualitative and positive change in the approach to general education in Israel.

The majority were of the opinion that the values of Zionist Socialism were bankrupt. The disappointment over the Yom Kippur war contributed to the general disaffection. Hundreds of letters from secularist parents and teachers began to stream into the office of the new minister. The all contained a similar request: "Give our children roots. Teach them Judaism--give them a foundation for their continued existence in this land."

How did the Department of Education respond to this plea? What was done in the past 2 years to fulfill the promise?

Dr Daniel Truper is the special assistant to the minister of education and is in charge of the Judaism program. He is one of the past founders of the Gesner movement. With his characteristic fairness he asks us to look at the past history of education in Israel. He explains: "One cannot say that all this began with us. A score of years ago our secularist educators felt the need of Judaism education. In 1959 Zalman Oren (deceased) introduced a program aimed at instilling a Jewish consciousness. Since then there were many waves of Judaism in the educational program. The last wave reached us under minister Aharon Yadlin immediately after the Yom Kippur War. Yadlin expanded the departments for Jewish Zionist education and introduced a new program for the teaching of oral Torah in the schools. At this point Zevulun Hammer took up his post. The fact that today there is a religious minister of education is simply a reflection of the atmosphere prevailing in the country. Had a religious minister of education been appointed in 1955 there would have been some who would have agitated for a military revolution in Israel, but in 1977 such an appointment is representative of the general consensus. We, therefore came to the department with a declared policy of a Judaism supplement to the educational program with a high priority and with adequate financial resources. But all this is not enough. The difficulties are severe. Who will carry out the program? The teachers? These teachers received their education under the general program. Their knowledge in the field of Judaism is extremely weak. To put it mildly how can one teach Judaism when that individual does not know what it is and what it contains?

"But we did not despair. One thing was in our favor and it was of the utmost importance. The teachers perceived the importance of the subject and the necessity of transmitting Judaism to our youth. Without the dedication of the teachers we would not have succeeded."

I asked: "Do you mean to say nobody opposed your initiative?"

Dr Truper: "You will be surprised to hear that the great majority of the teachers were in favor. Those who were against represented a very small percentage. When I proposed the new subject at a meeting of superintendents one from the Tel Aviv district arose and shouted 'religious coercion'. I explained we are not coercing we are simply proposing. Whoever wishes will attempt it. What is most interesting is the manner in which the other superintendents present at the meeting silenced the protestor with a sharp rebuke. Some cutting remarks were passed on her inability to grasp the concept."

Wonderful, I noted. But where are these new schools of Judaism? From conversations with secularist youngsters I was scarcely impressed that any deep change has taken place in their world outlook.

Dr Truper smiling: "The education minister has been in office only 2 years. I have been at this post for a year and one month. The educational program is a very conservative and weighty project. Every change stretches over many years. Nevertheless a change is already discernible; a change in the amount of effort expended and a change in approach. What does a change in approach imply? As I explained previously we lack teachers of Judaism. Our present teachers are ignorant. We are waging a war without soldiers. At one time we considered sending teachers from the government religious schools to our schools. But that is not practical. There are not sufficient teachers in the government religious to allocate to our project. Even advanced studies for teachers would not help. Only a teacher who is more or less versed in the subject can gain from advanced studies. Where the knowledge is zero advanced studies are useless.

It is a fact, for example, that in the teaching of the oral Torah difficulties are encountered over the entire range of the subject; in the middle schools as well as in the high schools. They are not eager nor do they know how to teach Gemara. Some disregard the directive and omit it completely. Others succeed only in instilling an antagonism to the subject.

What were we to do? In June of 1978 the idea was conceived that we devise a program of Jewish studies so detailed and clear that both the teacher and the student would be able to grasp it without any previous knowledge in the field. The teacher would learn with the pupil. Clearly this is not an ideal educational situation. We would prefer that the teacher be thoroughly grounded in the subject. Unfortunately we have no such teachers.

Question: How was the concept crystallized?

Dr Truper: "We established a chief staff consisting of Dr Aharon Agus, the head teacher of the Yeshiva "Merkaz HaRav" Shlomo Zimmerman and the secular teachers Yona Silberman and Rivka Shtrom. It was decided that the first concept to be dealt with would be the idea of repentance. According to the view of Emmanu'el Yafe (of blessed memory) the past chief of the pedagogical

secretariat we would begin by pressing the subject in the framework of the Bar Mitzva studies in grade seven. Please note: Not we the new minister and his religious counsellors instituted the Bar Mitzva program. In the previous session we already recognized that we would be forced as regards the seventh grade which was on the threshold of Bar Mitzva to devote a full year's study to the subject of Judaism. The trouble was that these good intentions and this beautiful program was never implemented. In July of 1978 the first staff met at the Geshar school in Safed. At the start of this school year in September we assembled the teachers and supervisors and proposed the experimental study of Judaism.

"The principle of the experiment is not to indoctrinate Torah and knowledge and not to stress the obligatory nature of the commandments but to attempt by conversations, question and answer periods and visual demonstrations to solve the ordinary problems of the students, relating to society, family and fellow students. The purpose would be to prove to them that Judaism dealt with these problems and found answers thousands of years ago."

What was the scope of this attempt?

Dr Troper: "We began with 80 classes; all the schools in Ramat-Gan, some schools in the central district and one school in Jerusalem. It was a tremendous effort. In the past we would try out a new idea in about 10 classes. Nevertheless we decided to begin on a large scale in order to maximize the number of students who would benefit from the very start from a proper teaching of their faith--Judaism."

How did the teachers react to this?

Dr Troper: "Most were enthusiastic. Moreover, after the programs had been prepared for holiday festivities, for the concept of repentance and for the dignity of the individual they demanded: 'How about the commandments' 'Why only philosophy and general concepts? Give us meaningful material on the commandments and how to stimulate their observance. Prepare a pamphlet on the Tefillin.'"

Did the attempt succeed?

Dr Troper: At the moment it is too early to tell. Next year an authoritative statistical study will be made and then we will know more. In any event during the school year I visited a score of schools sometimes in the company of Minister Hammer and sometimes in the company of Prof Ben-Shlomo and what we saw and heard was very encouraging. Prof Ben-Shlomo was in the habit of entering a seventh grade classroom and saying: "I heard that you have a new subject--Judaism. Tell me is it bad and dull? Do you think so?" The students in all the classes we visited literally leaped from their seats to deny the implication. "You are mistaken. It is a most interesting lesson. It is the best subject in the school."

I had my own method of investigation. I would write the names of all the subjects studied on the blackboard. I would ask the children to classify them according to preference. In all the classes the subject of Sons of commandments either headed the list or was one of the upper portion. One student said to me: "Now I know that Judaism deals with life." In truth we did not come to teach the children about psychology, the Mezuzah, or the washing of the hands. These concepts are far removed from their world. We put them in the position of onlookers from the outside; like viewers of museum spectacles. Our purpose was not to transmit information but to converse deeply with them; to discuss with them their daily lives; the life of the moment through Judaism. When the proper attitude is formed it will be easy to transmit the knowledge. If the child cannot be made to feel that Judaism is meaningful for him he will never be ready to learn its content.

Where do we go from here? What is the next stage?

Dr Troper: "In the coming year a program for the sons of commandments will be activated in 90 classes of grade 7 throughout the land. The present 80 experimental classes will continue part 1 of the program in the eighth grade. We have organized a new staff which will meet in July of this year. It is composed of secular educators. Its task will be to confirm or reject the new subjects in Judaism for clarification and instruction. In the advanced high school groups we have a program called: 'I-You and We'. In the high schools also we have the concept of Sons of commandments, but at a more advanced stage. The plan for the high school students is headed by Dr Shalom Rosenberg from the Department of Israeli Thinking at the Hebrew University and the first pamphlet on the nature of man will be distributed to all the schools immediately after Pentecost. The pamphlet contains a discussion of the nature of man from a philosophical viewpoint, an analysis of man as the image of God, quotations from the Bible, the letters of Rabbi Soloveitchik and etc. We will begin with a few classes in grades 11 and 12. If we are successful we will extend the program to 80 classes."

What about the children in classes 1 through 6?

Dr Troper: "Another committee under the leadership of Me'ir Ayeli from Kibbutz Yifat has prepared programs for the lower grades and a number of original pamphlets on the holidays are being introduced into the schools of the northern district."

How did the Kibbutz Educational Organization react to your initiative?

Dr Troper: "The kibbutzim did not wait for us. The revision in the approach to Judaism prevails there as well. For example they have a seminar called Oranim consisting of educational professionals like Yairiv Ben-Aharon, Me'ir Ayeli, Moshe Keren and others. They have already designed a program for Judaism and it is being introduced in the seminar. There is a tendency towards Judaism in Oranim. A silent revolution has taken place in kibbutz education. In Givat Brenner a staff of teachers is at work with the assistance of the Department of Education on an integrated program for Judaism which will include Jewish history, Bible, Talmud and basic concepts. Naturally there are

always some overt signs of opposition. There are kibutzim and village schools who are antagonistic to the idea. But the kibutz movement in general is in favor."

Will the new program replace the teaching of Torah?

Dr Troper: "On the contrary. There is no reason why there should be a difference in the knowledge acquired by a religious child and a secular one. Both need to know Torah and Judaism, even though one may observe the commandments and the other may not. For this reason there is a renewed intensity towards the close of the program in the study of oral Torah; new pamphlets are published for the teachers, a course is given in Bar-Ilan University to qualify tutors and preceptors in the oral Torah. We anticipate that eventually they will become capable teachers of the subject and serve in the government school organization. The Department of Education and Culture allocates 15 percent of its total allotment for advanced studies to advanced studies in Judaism. This was a decision of the previous session. It has provided us with teeth i.e. a concrete budget. It is important to emphasize that Minister Hammer did not change directions nor cause a revolution. He only implemented matters that had been decided by his predecessors."

Are there any additional plans? Long range?

Dr Troper: "There is a plan in the research stage to prepare a series of television programs of an instructive nature on the subject of Judaism. It will be in the style of the 'Street of Surprises' program. Dr Louis Bernstein the head of the abovementioned program is working on it. It is clear beyond a doubt that if the teaching of Judaism is confined to the classroom with no external reinforcement the effect will be neither deep or lasting. The television programs will provide this reinforcement. Within two years we hope to begin broadcasting. Within 2 years I expect a complete change in the entire government educational system. In four or five years we hope to institute the teaching of Judaism in all the grades from 1-12. It is reasonable to assume that the youth raised in our country will be more firmly committed to Judaism and to his country than has been the case heretofore."

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CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

ENERGY MINISTER PRESSES PLAN TO CONSERVE ENERGY

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 20 May 79 p 4

[Article: "Condensed Version of Modea's Plan for Energy Conservation"]

[Text] Today the energy and transportation minister Mr Modea will present his condensed plan comprising 11 paragraphs whose end purpose is to save 40 million dollars this year in the energy needs of Israel. It is to be hoped that it will receive immediate acceptance by the sub-committee of ministers dealing with this subject.

Mr Modea, who chaired this sub-committee in the past, decided to present a condensed version of the plan. Originally he had presented it to the government in 1978, but according to his words the expanded version met with red tape and endless debate. The condensed version contains paragraphs such as: Households are obliged to purchase solar water tanks, attaching energy saving devices, raising the tax on large vehicles, forbidding inter-city vehicular traffic where the vehicle has only one occupant, changes in the hours when stores and offices may be open and acceptance of summer daylight hours for the balance of the year.

The condensed plan (the energy office wishes to implement it this year) contains a recommendation for a program of directives which may be activated if the need arose. This would include the prohibition of vehicular traffic on the Sabbath and the closing of service stations on the Sabbath and on holidays.

After telephone conversations with the ministers this past week Minister Modea reconsidered and decided to take part in the discussions on energy conservation at the ministers' meeting. He agreed to chair the committee for only one meeting. He believed the ministers would recognize the pressing need for acceptance of such a plan in view of the world-wide crisis in the petroleum market. The committee was established 2 months ago to deal with objections raised by members of the ministers' committee against certain provisions in the comprehensive plan. Its members, the ministers Ehrlic, Burg, Patt and Landau, almost failed to get together.

Following are the clauses of the plan:

Reform of the statute on building and planning so as to remove any restrictions on the installation of solar tanks and to make obligatory such installations in private and public construction.

Nullifying the obligation of unit owners in cooperative dwellings to share in the expense of central heating. In February the proposal to abolish this statute had already been presented to the Justice Department.

The installation of safety and energy saving devices in public buildings and in buildings used by the public such as supermarkets, hotels and factories.

Increasing the purchase tax and the annual license fee for large vehicles (gas eaters) indirectly to lessen the demand for gasoline.

Promulgation of a reform to forbid automobile travel on intercity routes where the auto contains one person. Drivers of private vehicles will be stopped at inspection points and be required to add other passengers. Otherwise they will be forced to park their cars and become a party to another vehicle.

Preparation of emergency measures to permit a complete cessation of all vehicular traffic when the situation becomes critical. Cessation of all commercial traffic on the Sabbath and holidays.

Preparation of emergency measures to enable the closing of all gasoline stations on the Sabbath and holidays if the situation warrants it, also a statute lowering the maximum allowable speed to 80 km per hour.

Activating a program of summer daylight hours. Correspondingly, regulations should be passed mandating the start of work in factories at 7 am, school sessions at 8 am, offices at 9 am and business places and banks at 10 am. This would reduce traffic on the roads. The cessation of afternoon closings of places of business and stores. All of the above would serve to conserve electricity.

Transition to the use of diesel fuel for any commercial vehicle over 2.2 tons. The debate is still going on as to what limitation to put on private vehicles.

A statutory directive to ensure regular automatic lighting in the streets. Lighting will be activated only when the sun sets. A sub-paragraph in this directive would require display windows to be illuminated by neon only.

An alteration in the government's decision making (with the consent of the Knesset) which would grant authority to the government in a situation designated as an energy emergency to confirm an immediate price change in the price of gasoline and in the costs of electricity. This would put a stop to the long drawn out process of confirmation by the Knesset and its committees.

Mr. Modea states that if the recommendations contained in his condensed plan are realized there will be an annual reduction in the Israeli consumption of energy of 5 percent. The entire Israeli energy demand is more than 800 million dollars annually. The particular characteristic of the condensed plan is that it does not significantly decrease the demand. It only prevents its increase. In contrast the comprehensive plan had as its purpose an actual decrease in demand.

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CS0: 4805

ISRAEL

CRITICAL HOUSING SHORTAGE CALLED A TIME BOMB

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 22 May 79 p 3

[Article: "Dangerous Consequences of a Continued Housing Shortage"]

[Text] Those engaged in dealing with the present housing shortage regard it as a powerful time bomb with a short fuse which is about to go off. In contrast, there are other well-intentioned people who haven't as yet perceived that we are faced by a national problem which demands top priority in our socioeconomic life.

Those among us who still remember 20 years ago the prevalence of transit camps throughout the land are amazed at the high quality of building in our cities on the one hand and the cries of housing shortages on the other. They do not realize how closely connected this is with our socioeconomic conditions.

To fully understand the problem we must analyze it and recognize its four basic components:

1. Housing for the poor
2. Housing for young newlyweds
3. Housing for new immigrants
4. Housing for the Arab population

The extent of the housing shortage in our cities touches tens of thousands of families in need of dwellings. Some are the last remainders of the transit camps. Others represent a dwelling problem of a temporary nature because of the extensive new immigration. Some are renters in housing for new immigrants, in abandoned properties, in dilapidated buildings destined to be demolished. Some families live at a rate of congestion of 3+ persons to a room because of their deprived condition.

Much was done to solve this housing problem during the reign of the Alignment, despite the continuous additions of new layers of population due to the demolition of the old buildings and our revised concept of proper dwellings. There ensued a continuous decrease in the numbers of the

distressed families and we were able to look hopefully toward the time when the problem would be solved. The Arab population in the mixed cities constituted a distressingly deprived segment in the matter of housing. In the latter years of the Alinement reign attention was directed to this troublesome area and steps were initiated to solve the problem.

Since the upheaval of 1977 two central occurrences took place in the area of the housing crisis:

1. Grandiose plans were drawn by the prime minister, the vice-premier and the housing ministers Patt and Levy.
2. Failure and complete ineptitude in implementation. A significant reduction in the solution of vexing problems beginning with the first steps after the demonstrations at Wadi Saleb.

In 1977 and 1978 there was an allocation of housing to those in need, but the start of their construction was initiated during the period of the Alinement. 1979 ushered in a total freeze in this field accompanied by all the severe social implications in such a situation. The cynics among us may try to reassure us by noting that we have already become accustomed to a crisis situation and we should not be overly disturbed. The majority of those in dire need of housing are numbered among the weaker sections of the population. Their ability to oppose this inequity is limited, and there is little danger of violent demonstrations in the style of Wadi Saleb or the Black Panthers.

A similar situation prevails among the deprived Arabs. In the mixed cities their lot is similar to that of the depressed Jewish classes but with the significant difference that very little attention is directed to their condition. They present less of a danger to the regime because of their fatalistic attitude and their impotence in the social struggle.

The Arab farmers were suddenly faced by a housing shortage, but not because of economic pressures. The government instituted a discriminatory allocation plan for Israeli land. But even this segment does not constitute a significant threat to the government in the housing crisis inasmuch as they lack the organization for a public struggle.

The neglect of the regime, the gross social inequities and the ineptitude in dealing with the deprived classes cry unto the heavens. The Arab bloc suffers the same lack of attention. All of this serves to add another component to the time bomb waiting to explode.

The above is not true of two additional segments of the population; the newlywed couples and the immigrants. An injury to them is equivalent to an injury to the future development of the state. It significantly undermines the strength and ability of the state to grapple with the grave problems facing us.

The Likud regime began its activity in the field of housing with vociferous proclamations; plans guaranteeing rental apartments, correction of the Alinement's shortcomings by selling all vacant dwellings to the highest bidder, and a stimulus to the private sector by completely abandoning all government sponsored public housing.

Public housing starts decreased by 30 percent when compared to the period of the Alinement. But the rescue and salvation from the private sector delayed in coming. The private sector continued building villas and luxury apartments which were commercially very profitable. The supply of public housing shrank as the reserves set aside by the Alinement were exhausted.

In 1979 a young couple had to pay 1 million lira for an apartment dwelling. This sum was equivalent to their income for an 8-year period. Even this price was considered by many as an outstanding bargain. There is still a limited supply of cheap apartments in the development areas, but this supply does not meet the existing demand.

In the immediate future thousands of young couples will be added to those who are being faced by the question of where to build their future; how to obtain an apartment and start a family. Young people leaving the army will pose to themselves, to us and to the regime this vexing question: What to do? May not the prospect of emigration entice some of them? May we not be faced by waves of emigration by this generation which represents the future of our state?

Another consequence of this critical housing shortage is that it threatens to decrease the rate of immigration. It may result in stagnation in a sensitive area at a time when we hoped for an increase in immigration.

Overflowing absorption centers and letters from immigrants attest to the critical situation in the housing shortage. These two segments of the population are truly a potential time bomb.

At this point we must pose the question. Can we still afford a wait of 2 years before elections so that we can grapple with this problem?

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CSO: 4805

WATER SHORTAGE CRISIS IN AMMAN DISCUSSED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 6 Jun 79 p 6

[Article by Ziyad al-Shillah: "Water Is Biggest of All Problems; With Onset of Summer, Water Trade Flourished; Are Poor Pumping Capacity and Wornout Network Real Causes of Crisis?"]

[Text] Summer and Water

With the onset of summer, water problems in the capital have begun to appear and the problem of health dangers resulting from the spread of contagious diseases, international among children, has begun to escalate. We are celebrating this year the world child's year. It is certain that the best gift we can offer our child is to make him physically strong, healthy and free of diseases. This can be achieved only through cleanliness. The mainstay of cleanliness is water and in Amman, water is precious and scarce. The problem of insufficient water supply in the capital is not a new problem. It disappears a little in the winter to reemerge in the summer. All are complaining of the lack of water, i.e. the complaint is general. Some say that water never reaches them and others say that the water they get is not enough for their main need. In any case, if you want to make sure of our words, brother citizen, then you are invited to spend with us a night that you choose in any place or area in Amman and see how the citizens spend their night awake waiting for water to reach them, and most often it does not reach them.

Why Scarcity of Water?

The talk about water scarcity is rampant and the reasons are numerous. We have toured various quarters of the capital and most of the citizens' complaints have been similar. We have emerged from our tour with the following outcome:

Al-Nuzhah Quarter Is Thirsty

In Jabal al-Nuzhah, the citizens complain that water has not reached them for almost 5 weeks and that when it does reach them, they get it at a

late hour of the night and at very low pressure. They attribute this to the fact that they live in a high area and to the fact that the pipeline that supplies their mountain also supplies other areas below them. This is why the water gets to the lower areas first.

Old Network

There is another point, namely that the water network is almost a quarter century old. They point out that the residents of the eastern section get their water, thanks to the new pipeline laid down by the Water Authority.

The residents of Jabal al-Nuzhah say that if the quantity of water pumped to their mountain is increased, then water would reach them. When water does reach them, it reaches them at a late hour of the night and at very low pressure. Thus, they don't get the chance to collect enough water, at least for their main needs.

Water Trade and Tankers

Jabal al-Nuzhah residents say that this being the situation, they resort to meeting their needs by way of water supplied by tanker trucks belonging to both the public and the private sectors. Here the exploitation starts because the residents can get the Water Authority's truck tankers with extreme difficulty and after a wait of 2 or more days, that is if they can get these tankers.

Driver's Disposition and Greed

The citizens have to put up with the despotic behavior of the tanker drivers. Moreover, if a citizen wants to give some of the tanker water to another citizen, the driver that this would be tantamount to private and not public distribution.

So, the citizens are forced to use private water tankers which charge astronomical prices. The cost of one cubic meter of water reaches at times 1.5 dinars. This imposes exorbitant costs which the citizens cannot shoulder. This is in addition to the difficulty of getting the water tankers.

Al-Akhdar Also

If we move to al-Jabal al-Akhdar, we find new problems, in addition to the problems of Jabal al-Nuzhah. The residents here say that the shortage of water is due to a technical reason, namely the capacity of the pipeline supplying the area is very high whereas the capacity of the pipes supplying water to homes is low and this causes constant breakages in the subsidiary pipes. This has forced the Water Authority to supply water to al-Jabal al-Akhdar through the Nazzel Quarter water main. Considering that the

water pressure in the Nazzal Quarter water main is low to start with, the water supply is no longer sufficient here or there. Consequently, water reaches al-Jabal al-Akhdar only late at night and at very low pressure, filling only a few barrels that are hardly enough for drinking. Here again we resort to the authority's water tankers for which we have to wait 2 or 3 days at times to get the water, [say Jabal al-Akhdar residents]. So we are forced to resort to the privately owned tanker trucks which charge nearly 1.5 dinars for a single cubic meter of water.

When Will Water Arrive?

Another problem that al-Jabal al-Akhdar residents face is that there is a complete quarter, namely al-'Amawi Quarter, that does not get water at all because the water network has not reached the quarter altogether. The residents of al-'Amawi Quarter say: We have submitted numerous applications but the network has not been extended to us yet. If we ask the authority for a water tanker, it asks us for a land survey. When they agree to supply us with water, they send a tanker to give each home 2 cubic meters of water. This is why we only get water from the privately owned tankers. Thus, the price of a single cubic meter of water reaches 1.5 dinars.

Water Shortage Is Chronic Problem

If you, brother citizen, continue your tour in the various quarters of the capital, you will find nothing new. All quarters complain of the lack of water.

But what is the water situation in the capital or, to put it more clearly, what are the sources of water in the capital and are they actually incapable of meeting the citizens' demands? Or does the whole issue require nothing but reorganization?

Capital's Water Sources

Amman gets its water from two main sources: The water pumped by the water plants of the Water Authority and the water wells belonging to the authority and to some citizens.

Concerning the Water Authority's wells, there are five of them in Amman and its vicinity, namely in the areas of Wadi al-Rimam, Ra's al-'Ayn, 'Abdun, 'Ayn Ghazal and a new well near the broadcasting station. The quantity of water pumped by these wells amounts to nearly 5,000 cubic meters daily that are distributed by the authority's tankers.

The private water wells, numbering nine, are located in al-Baq'ah, 'Ayn Ghazal, Marka and 'Awjan. These wells produce 4,000 cubic meters daily which are distributed by privately owned water tankers.

Thus we find that all the water sources, including the water network, pump nearly 50,000 cubic meters of water to the capital every 24 hours. This quantity is equal to nearly one half the quantity that is supposed to be consumed by the capital daily.

Profitable Trade With No Controls

Before we end our tour, we must say a word. It is that the citizen is right in complaining about his inability to buy water from the privately-owned water tankers and his inability to get water from the Water Authority's wells.

In the first case, we find that a water tanker with a capacity of 6 cubic meters ranges from 6 to 8 dinars whereas this quantity does not cost the tanker owner more than half a dinar. The tanker driver pays one half a dinar for 6 cubic meters of water. He also pays half a dinar for daily parking, half a dinar for the broker and half a dinar for his truck's fuel, keeping in mind that a tanker truck makes three to four trips daily. This is why we find that many citizens are engaging in the water trade.

In the second case, the citizen can only get the water tanker after a wait of 2 to 3 days.

Finally, we must say that there is actually a water crisis.

We are not asking for miracles. We are only asking that water sale by the Water Authority's tankers be organized, that stricter control be imposed on the privately owned tankers and that a price be set for all to abide by.

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CSO: 4802

PRESENCE OF MISSING IMAM DENIED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 28 May-3 Jun 79 p 6

[Article: "First Statements of Their Kind Made by al-Qadhdhafi's Special Envoy to Tehran: Al-Sadr Has Never Been Our Foe and They Are Welcome to Search for Him in Libya"]

[Text] Tehran--Sa'd Mujabbar spent three and a half months in Iran as Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's special envoy. He is the man who prepared for Maj 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud's visit to Tehran and Qom and is now preparing for more than normal relations between the two countries.

Before Mujabbar left Tehran for a short visit to Tripoli, AL- NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI had an interview with him.

Mujabbar explained that Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Iran has not been delayed "because it has not been in the picture so far. Both Khomeyni and Colonel al-Qadhdhafi are very busy. Al-Qadhdhafi is preoccupied with confronting the retrogression witnessed by the area in the wake of al-Sadat's capitulation. As for Khomeyni's problems, they are well-known and we do not want to entangle them with the presence of the colonel whose visit may require the Iranian revolution leaders to devote their time to him when they are still working to lay down the foundations of the revolution and to set up the new Islamic state."

Libyan Viewpoint

On the Libyan viewpoint concerning the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, Mujabbar explains it as follows, keeping in mind that this is the first time a statement of the kind is made by a Libyan official:

"Imam Musa al-Sadr has never been a foe of the Jamahiriyyah. Those in Lebanon against whom the Jamahiriyyah stands are the isolationists who cooperate with Israel and who want to partition Lebanon, to weaken the Palestinian revolution and to liquidate the Palestinian presence. Musa al-Sadr is a friend who visited us more than once. There are the following definite facts:

"1. If Libya harbored Imam al-Sadr any ill intentions, then Lebanon is an easy place for liquidations and assassinations. Libya has no interest in a criminal act of the sort because such an act is incompatible with the conduct and ethics of the revolution."

"2. The man did actually leave the country [Libya] with his two companions and we have the following documents:

"A. An entry visa to Rome found on the Imam's passport which is presently in the possession of the Lebanese authorities."

"B. Concerning 'Abbas Badr-al-Din, the journalist who accompanied the Imam, the Libyan and Lebanese authorities have a zincograph copy of the separate temporary 24-hour visa given to those who want to enter Italy. This visa is given only if two conditions are met: That the applicant for the visa be personally present at Rome airport with a valid passport in the presence of the Italian police and that he show a confirmed reservation for departure on the following day."

"3. We have a query cable from ALITALIA office in Beirut to ALITALIA office in Tripoli. We also have the reply to this query which confirms the departure of al-Sadr and his companions to Rome aboard flight 881."

"But the Italians, especially the embassy in Tehran, say that the people who used the passports to enter [Rome] are not the real owners of the passports."

"The forging of passports is something that happens in two forms: First, by changing the photograph on the passport and, second, changing the facial appearance of the passport bearer so that he may look like the photograph on the passport. When the Italian government says that the two men who entered with the passports of Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Shihadah Ya'qub are not the real owners of the passports, then this raises a perplexing question. Who are the two persons who entered Italy, how did Italy know that they are not the real persons and where are these two persons who used the passports to enter Italy, especially since the passports, along with the suitcases, were found at the Holiday Inn? The Italian authorities cannot say that the two persons are not al-Sadr and Ya'qub and then go silent."

"We do not at all doubt that the case of Imam Musa al-Sadr is connected with the current conflict in the Arab area and, consequently, in Lebanon and Palestine. The force that is going after the Arabs, the Moslems and the Palestinian issue is the force responsible for this crime which we condemn strongly."

"The question that persists is: What interest do we have in the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr? Now that he has disappeared, what benefit

have we reaped? As Arabs and Moslems, we cannot invite a person to our country and then harm him or permit any harm to be inflicted on him. As for those who claim that al-Sadr is present in Libya, if they know our country better than we do--and in this case they can only be the ones who kidnapped him in Italy and brought him to Libya--then they are welcome to come to Libya with whomever they want to show us where he is. We are ready to accept the humiliation of the discovery that the man is in our country without our knowledge and ready to uncover the failure of our intelligence in this regard."

"In any case, it is a sufficient source of pride and honor for us that Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, says that he does not accuse Libya but asks for its help. These words are present on a tape recorded during Khomeyni's meeting with Major Jallud. In view of the declaration of this responsible Iranian position, Major Jallud has called for a joint Libyan-Iranian effort to search for His Eminence Imam al-Sadr."

Al-Qadhafi's Visit

[Question] What about al-Qadhafi's visit to Iran?

[Answer] As I have already said, the visit has not been delayed because it has been out of the picture for the reasons that I have already pointed out, namely the preoccupation of both the brother colonel and Khomeyni. All have noticed that the time that Khomeyni devoted to Jallud was record time. Khomeyni received Jallud twice, on the day following his arrival and the day before his departure. One of the most important results of the meetings between Jallud and the Iranian revolution leaders is that we found that our opinions are identical.

A final word, it is a regrettable thing for a man to notice the negative and wrong position taken by some Arab papers toward the Islamic revolution in Iran which has given another dimension to the Palestinian revolution and to the number one Arab cause.

8494

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

BRIEFS

NEW OPPOSITION PAPER--The second newspaper opposed to the Libyan regime has been published in the same month. The new paper is called AL-JIHAD [Struggle] and its slogan is: "A word of truth in the face of an unjust ruler is the best form of struggle." The paper describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Libyan National Movement." The first edition contains a criticism of the Libyan government's policy, of Chairman al-Qadhdhafi's position toward the Ugandan problem and of the issue of the kidnapping and liquidation of Imam al-Sadr and his two companions. It also contains articles entitled: "Why Is It Necessary to Topple the Regime? Who Killed Yusuf al-Azmaralli? The Heretical Book and the Caravan of Martyrs." The first newspaper published was SAWT LIBYA [Voice of Libya], the voice of the Democratic National Movement. It seems that the opposition to the Libyan regime is expanding rapidly. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Jun 79 p 12] 8494

CSO: 4902

MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY PRIME MINISTER CRITICIZED

Casablanca AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 16 May 79 pp 1, 3

[Article: "Democratic Labor Confederation Announces: It Is the Masses Who Will Pay for the Band-aid Measures Announced by the Government"]

[Text] On 27 April 1979, the prime minister and minister of justice announced in a speech a number of measures involving certain solutions of demands made of the government. The Democratic Labor Confederation [CDT] made a commitment through its secretary general, Noubair al-Amaoui, in a 1 May speech to apprise public opinion of its position toward these measures.

In compliance with its promise, today it is publishing a preliminary analysis of the measures announced by the prime minister's speech in order to enlighten strugglers and the masses. It will later publish a detailed study of its position toward the ways these resolutions adopted by the government will be put into practice.

This suppression is particularly evident in their trials of and issuance of harsh and unfair sentences against many persons, as well as in the resolution on arbitrary discharge from jobs that was adopted against hundreds in the health and education field, not because of any transgression but because they were exercising their constitutional right to strike. In this regard, the prime minister and minister of justice ought to have announced resolutions abrogating the arbitrary actions taken against strugglers of the National Education Union and the National Public Health Union in order to reaffirm right, justice and the legitimacy of striking as provided in Article 14 of the constitution, and so creating a suitable climate for a continued dialogue with representatives of the workers. This is what we have stressed, and will do so, both in previous meetings with the government or in the note submitted to it.

In the speech given by the prime minister Friday evening, 27 April, about a number of trivial measures, the government claimed that its goal was to reduce social disparities and cope with the crisis which is oppressing the working class. The fact is that this unilateral announcement of these resolutions came in the wake of grave violations of the constitution and

of laws presently in force, and in the wake of the suppression that has been and is still being directed at the strugglers of the CDT.

These resolutions are characterized by their general nature, and lack any precise definition as to any tangible and necessary ways for implementing them. Accordingly, they will not resolve the real problems facing the Moroccan working class, which has been asked to make extensive sacrifices. This confirms that the present government is not abandoning the capitalist course that basically serves the interests of the bourgeoisie, the course that caused the crisis which the country is experiencing.

The CDT, in pursuing the issues of the working class and in order to do its duty in enlightening the strugglers and masses, instructed its economic and social committee to make a preliminary study of the issue with the understanding that it would later make a full study when the government revealed how these resolutions would be put into practice.

If we leave out certain promises, we can herewith summarize the measures that have been adopted as:

1. A retreat from the increase in the price of water and electricity.
2. Slight increases in pay levels.
3. An announcement of the completion of certain projects that had been underway for a long time.

Who Will Really Benefit From the Decision To Retreat From the Increases in the Price of Water and Electricity?

1. The retreat from the increase in the price of water and electricity:

The need to back off from the unreasonable increases in the price of water and electricity was implicit in the note of demands that the CDT submitted to the officials, reinforced by the position of progressive consultants in certain municipal councils.

While we feel that this government retreat was a gain resulting from the struggles of the working classes and various popular classes, we should pose some questions as long as it has not been made public who will really benefit from this retreat since the question now, following this decision, is: Will this resolution apply even to the big institutions that had immediately raised the price of their products (with the approval of the governmental officials) following the announcement of the increased price of water and electricity? If this happens, that is, applying the resolution to the big institutions, it would mean that the government would give these big institutions assistance of no less than 15 billion centimes a year in increased profits that they have received and would receive after raising the price of their products in passing on the increased price of water and electricity. In addition to this, we have learned that the decision to

back off from the price increase will cost about 30 billion centimes so the next question is: Who is going to pay this price for all practical purposes? Will it be the owners of the big capitalist institutions? We think this unlikely at the present time, because the nature of the decisions by the officials generally do not come into conflict with the interests of capitalism. Or, will the popular class pay the cost in the form of indirect taxes by paying what it gained in the backdown on the price of water and electricity in the cost of materials that will continually rise because of anticipated inflation? In this event, we can simply say that there was no actual retreat from the increase for water and electricity. The whole thing is that this increase, rather than coming from water and electricity, will be broken down in various essential consumer materials, and so the government's decision was not a retreat from the increase but rather was only a blurring of it.

The Increase in Private Sector Pay Did Not Take Into Account the Lowered Purchasing Power of the Worker Since 1972 That Requires Raising the Minimum to 1,000 Dirhams

2. On pay levels:

In the prime minister's speech, he announced that beginning 1 May the minimum pay level in the industrial and commercial sector would rise 30 percent and 40 percent in the peasant sector. He made a commitment to an increase of 10 percent beginning in January 1980. In other words, the prime minister authorized a pay increase of 2 to 3 dirhams at best. These partial measures raise the following observations:

In pursuing its previous pay policy, the government did not abandon its "discriminatory and unjust" position when it continued to retain the damage to farm workers by a totally unjustified halt that must be abrogated. It should be pointed out that even some pro-government papers have, though not explicitly, alluded to abrogation of this discrimination as urged by the CDT.

In any case, a minimum wage assumes maximum importance in a country such as ours given the monstrous exploitation it faces in its excessive cost of living. Therefore, the minimum wage should not only be an "index," as is the case in a number of European countries; rather, it should be the actual wage received by most workers. Accordingly, a policy actually designed to reduce class differences and improve the situation of the working class must start with the minimum and basic needs of the working class and take into consideration the decline in workers' purchasing power, particularly since 1972. Therefore, the government must--if only to conform at least to the logic of its claims--respond to the legitimate demands which are based on scientific and precise studies and which require fixing the minimum wage at 1,000 dirhams. These are the demands that the CDT put forward in its note to government officials.

However, the government, rather than trying to set the minimum wage at 1,000 dirhams in the context of a comprehensive plan and on the basis of a national wage policy that would respond to the proposals of the real representatives of the workers, has tried to do just the opposite to authorize a slight increase.

There will be only a very limited "benefit" from even this slight increase, because it will be subject to limitations arising from the nature of exploitation in Morocco and of the type of worker who will benefit from this action. This is because there is a sizeable number of workers in our country who work at low wages because there are no clear, precise, practical ways to apply the steps that have been announced, and they will benefit only slightly from them.

Workers in the big institutions have through their struggles imposed increases in pay closely approaching the proposed increases, and this will cause them to benefit only slightly from the announced changes. On the other hand, the prime minister "called upon" the big businessmen to authorize a pay increase of 100 to 116 dirhams on condition that they had not obtained an equal amount beginning in May 1978, and any increase from May 1978 to May 1979 would be deducted from the 100 dirhams, despite the paltry nature of this increase. Given the frightening decline in purchasing power, particularly in the past few years (at least 50 percent), these actions are to be construed as disregard of and, in fact, a violation of the 1959 law on the moving scale, the law that legislated the terms for applying wage increases in light of rises in the cost of living, a law which the prime minister is aware of and which were it applied and respected now, the deserved increase would have been something reasonable.

When the prime minister makes the 100-116 dirham increase contingent upon there having been no previous increase since May 1978, we find ourselves forced to pose this question: Why is the month of May 1978 the base point? Do the officials believe that the social disparities only began this past year? If the government does believe this, doesn't it follow from the logic of the government itself that the new increase should be applied retroactively beginning in May 1978 for those persons who had not benefited from any increase for a year or longer?

Pay Increases for White Collar Workers Should Be at Least 70 Percent Rather Than 10 Percent

With regard to white collar workers, the prime minister announced an increase of 10 percent beginning in May 1979, and made a commitment to a 5 percent increase starting in January 1980 (this involves the lower pay scales). If the government with its various agencies, recognizes the aggravating social disparities, it would really be stupid to say that these emaciated steps will alleviate them or help to raise the living standard of white collar workers. It was this situation that prompted the CDT, after precise and scientific studies of the economic and social situation on the one hand,

and of wages and their real purchasing power on the other, to urge an increase of at least 70 percent to cover minimum and essential needs.

Band-aid Solutions Will Not Solve the Complex Problems of the Working Class in the Absence of a Comprehensive Economic Plan

It should also be pointed out here that the prime minister's speech did not define any understanding of or limits to the lowest wages to which the increase would apply, keeping in mind that it is the white collar workers who in fact get the lowest wages. What is a low wage? As usual, he did not talk about the financing means the government intends to use for these increases in such a way as to "persuade us" that even these paltry and haphazard increases are in fact meant to be a humble attempt to reduce, if only very slightly, the dreadful social disparities, because an analysis of the governmental wage measures make some things clear:

A. The proposed increase will in no way solve the complex problems facing the working class, which must continue its battles.

B. These trivial increases are in themselves threatening as long as nothing is made public about the "means to finance them," as it is quite probable that the private sector will turn to increasing prices and piling up profits.

C. The government talks about keeping an eye on prices, while everyone knows that the government's usual measures lead to nothing or, at best, to "repression" of the little people, while the bigwigs are left to do what they want. What is needed is the adoption of economic decrees that will close the door to monopolists.

If these band-aid measures are not brought into the context of a comprehensive economic plan, the masses will have to pay the cost, since the liberal capitalists will increase more than the prices of their goods, a further deterioration will occur, the crisis will grow more complex and it will be the capitalists who will really benefit from all this.

In his speech the prime minister made an announcement about certain achievements, achievements which had been expected to be completed a long time ago had it not been for procrastinations, such as the 'Ayn al-Shaq sanitorium, which was built with social security funds after many obstacles. He also advised that convening of the Higher Public Service Council and establishment of the Social and Economic Council would take place soon.

The question that arises about the Higher Public Service Council is: Will it let the real representatives of the white collar workers play their full role to defend the rights of their representatives? Will this council be given discretionary powers that will make it an effective and useful instrument? Or, will it remain only a framework for debate and dialogue, and will its decisions remain only recommendations? With regard to the Social and

Economic Council, our apprehension arises from the fact that this council could become a violation of the provisions of the 1959 law about the mobile wage scale that links pay rises with rises in prices.

In summary, the recent governmental measures were phrased in generalities with no definition of ways to put them in practice and without putting them in the context of a comprehensive plan really designed to reduce social disparities. This is what makes us fear that in the application phase these measures, no matter how weak they are in both the private and public sectors, could be threatened with being stripped of all content and with losing all effectiveness. Again this is what makes us apprehensive that the goal of officials behind all this is to fool public opinion and the working class in particular into thinking that the announced measures are positive in order to pacify people, gain time and reinforce the exploitation of the working class, that capitalist exploitation which, in fact, is the cause of the economic and social crisis that our country is experiencing.

Continued Dialogue Requires Prerequisites Involving the Abrogation of All Arbitrary Resolutions

Finally, the CDT would like to announce to public opinion its position on these "solutions" that were announced in the 17 April 1979 speech, fully conscious of the critical political, economic and social circumstances that our country is experiencing. On the one hand it welcomes any purposeful dialogue that will, in fact, serve the interests of the working class. At the same time, it would like to record the fact that the recent initiative that the government took toward the demands of the higher education personnel is a positive step in the government's recognition of the right to strike and returning to the constitution as the highest law. Consequently, it is a first step in retreating from the 7 April 1979 proclamation that abrogated this right. The government must, therefore, make public other measures abrogating all effects of the proclamation in order to provide and insure the prerequisites for a continued dialogue. This can be done by adopting the following immediate measures:

1. Releasing all detained union members.
2. Abrogating the arbitrary discharge decision that was taken against hundreds of strugglers of the National Public Health Union and the National Education Union.
3. Lifting the siege against the headquarters of the CDT.

The Executive Office
Casablanca
13 May 1979

FRENCH COMMERCIAL INVOLVEMENT IN SUDAN INCREASES

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 May 79 p 42

[Article by J.C.P.: "Giscard d'Estaing's Visit to Khartoum"]

[Text] Khartoum--During the last few years, France has become the fourth commercial partner of this pivotal country between black Africa and the Arab world. In February, a visit by Olivier Stern--who preceded Giscard d'Estaing to Khartoum by 24 hours--permitted acceleration of the application of an assistance protocol signed a year earlier in the amount of 100 million francs which are to be used to modernize the railway network (45 million), furnish irrigation equipment (30 million), purchase trucks and rehabilitate the oil pipeline which links the capital to Port Sudan. A second protocol, in an almost identical amount, is being negotiated.

However, the cooperation "package"--9 million francs in 1978--continues to be small; and the risks of the Sudanese market pose problems to French merchants. For example, Rhone-Poulenc, through the intermediary of its subsidiary FILAGRO [expansion unknown], reportedly is in danger of losing its largest contract in Africa (70 million francs for the supplying of 50 percent of the insecticides used by Sudanese cotton growers). For lack of financial cover by the COFACE [French Foreign Trade Insurance Company], the Sudanese, whose cotton continues to be the No 1 export product and who thus find themselves caught short, probably will not fail to bring up the subject, as the quality of their production is said to be threatened this year.

The French company TECHNIP [expansion unknown] is participating in the vast Kenana sugar project by constructing a plant there. There is also French participation in the textile, canning and tanning sectors. The most prestigious project--and the most controversial--continues, however, to be the digging in the south of the Jonglei canal with the participation of the International Construction Company and the French Enterprises Company. But this project, which was increased from 280 to 380 km in length to permit the recovery of 5 billion m³ of water from the White Nile

seems to be running into a number of difficulties (underestimated net cost and poor identification of the canal route). Finally, the geological and mining research bureau is exploring for copper and tungsten on the banks of the Red Sea.

On the cultural level, the 1969 agreement has permitted initiation of exchanges. The diffusion of the French language has resulted in the sending of 100 students to France on scholarships. More than 1,000 Sudanese patronize the French cultural center in Khartoum. Finally, Paris has offered two solar energy stations and has trained Sudanese researchers in this sector.

8143

CSO: 4800

PCS CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS ON SUDANESE SITUATION

Paris FRANCE NOUVELLE in French 26 May-1 Jun 79 pp 24-25

[Interview with Muhammad El Nur, member of the Sudanese Communist Party Central Committee by Jacques Varin, date unknown]

[Text] Jacques Varin: Since 1971, the year of Numayri's coup d'etat and of the anticommunist repression which followed it, the situation in the Sudan has changed...

Muhammad El Nur (fictitious name used for reasons of security): To understand the present situation in the Sudan, it is necessary to go back a little further to 25 May 1969 the date on which Numayri came to power as the result of a military coup d'etat.

The Communist Party was not in favor of a military coup d'etat, believing that the development of the mass movement--despite its advanced degree of organization--was not sufficient for it to sustain the coup d'etat effectively.

However, in consideration of the reasons offered by Numayri and the "free officers," who claimed to be progressive and anti-imperialists, the Sudanese Communist Party, the PCS, decided to support them. But a hostile policy toward the PCS was quickly developed by Numayri: efforts to bring about a schism in the party, a prohibition on legal activity, the expulsion to Egypt of the party's secretary general, 'Abd al-Khalik Mahjub, etc. These repressive maneuvers were also taken against other democratic and progressive sectors. And the party had to fight to maintain its independent existence in the face of the sole party plan.

Following the defeat of the movement launched in July 1971 by progressive officers, Numayri unleashed a massive repression against the democratic forces and most particularly against the communists. Comrade Mahjub, secretary general of the party, Chafieh Muhammad al-Shaykh, secretary general of the unions, and other leaders and activists were assassinated. Close to 20,000 communists and democrats were then arrested.

Eight years later, Numayri is indeed still in power; however, there is not a single communist now in prison.

In fact, it is because of the considerable development of the conflicts that the government had to release the political prisoners. Since April 1978, in particular, we have witnessed a great increase in strikes by workers (we have one of the most developed working classes on the continent), farm workers, intellectuals, government workers, etc.

Jacques Varin: How do you explain this weakening of a military regime which was so "muscular" at its outset?

Muhammad El Nur: First, although the Numayri government after July 1971 delivered severe blows to the democratic movement, it never was very solid. Numayri had to face several attempts at military coups d'etat; he has never succeeded in obtaining the durable adherence of the traditional political forces of the country. His sole party, the Sudanese Socialist Union, has never succeeded in becoming really established.

Moreover, in the last few years the Sudan has experienced a social and economic crisis which is becoming aggravated despite foreign aid, notably from Saudi Arabia.

To keep himself in power, Numayri has the support of 40,000 Egyptian soldiers stationed at various points in the country.

Now he is trying to promote a policy of "national reconciliation," notably with regard to the sectors of the right or "Muslim" sectors.

Jacques Varin: What is the attitude of the Islamic sectors? Do they support the government? Have the events in Iran had any effects on the Sudan?

Muhammad El Nur: The Islamic sectors are not in entire agreement with the government; relations between the "'Ummah" party which in a way represents them, Sadia al-Mahdi, chief of the Ansars sect, and the government are in a state of conflict, in spite of participation in the government by certain Islamic sectors.

The events in Iran doubtless have had a considerable effect. Considerable because of the power struggle throughout the region but also because of the situation in the Sudan.

The revolution in Iran was victorious because it was the expression of the popular will--it is a question of the struggle of the Iranian people--and not the expression of a military coup d'etat. This mass struggle is full of lessons; it proves to the peoples of the region that they can play a decisive role.

There have been many demonstrations in the Sudan supporting this struggle of the Iranian people.

Jacques Varin: What strategy is the PCS now developing?

Muhammad El Nur: Since 1973 we have defined as our principal strategy the preparation of a general political strike which will lead to the downfall of the government.

In its fight, the PCS is seeking the alliance of all forces opposed to the government that wish to reestablish democratic freedoms in our country. This has led us to propose the creation of a front of all the parties and organizations desiring to put an end to the regime of personal power of Numayri.

We have our own program; but we are not trying to impose it on our partners. We wish to establish a political action program which will be common to all antidictatorial forces.

Today the Sudanese Communist Party once again finds itself in opposition to the government; however, the Ba'thists, the 'Ummah Party, the National Democratic Party of Husayn al-Hindi, womens and union organizations, etc. are also opposed.

The party has always played a leadership role in the fight, even after the period of harshest anticommunist repression. We have always refused to fight in exile and the leadership of the party--with its secretary general, comrade Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud--has remained in the country.

In this way the party has been able inch by inch to regain its positions in the mass organizations and unions, from which the communists had been hounded. And we are trying to use the possibilities of legal work. As the result of the strike movements, the authorities placed in positions of responsibility by the government have been replaced by new leaders elected by the workers. A recent example, during the union elections among the teachers of Khartoum, the democrats, including communists, won 48 of 50 seats.

Jacques Varin: The Sudan has a particularly important strategic location. How do you evaluate its present role, and what role might it play?

Muhammad El Nur: Our country adjoins Chad, the Central African Empire, Zaïre and Uganda; therefore, it is a party to the problems of black Africa. Having a border with Libya and Egypt and running along the Red Sea, the Sudan is an Arab country and a state of the Middle East. Finally, having common borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, it is concerned by the situation in the Horn of Africa.

In his international relations, Numayri has aligned himself on almost all points with Sadat and, through him, with American imperialism.

Thus he is one of only two leaders of Arab states, along with Qabus of Oman, to have approved the Begin-As-Sadat-Carter agreements which are a betrayal of the cause of the Arab peoples and in particular the cause of the rights of the Palestinian people.

Moreover, that has contributed to increasing Numayri's isolation in the country, as even in government quarters a sharp opposition has appeared to the Begin-As-Sadat-Carter agreements; ambassadors have resigned as a mark of protest. This has happened to such a degree that, in spite of Egyptian pressures, Numayri is trying to backtrack.*

In Chad, Ethiopia and on the Arabian peninsula, Numayri's policy is in alignment with the reactionary interests of imperialism.

Jacques Varin: What international policy does the PCS wish to promote?

Muhammad El Nur: A policy of solidarity with the anti-imperialist fight of the Arab and African peoples.

We communists are developing our own ties of solidarity first of all, of course, with the communist and progressive Arab parties, such as the Egyptian Communist Party, the Iranian Communist Party, which today is experiencing a disturbing repression; the Socialist Party of Yemen, which is conducting a courageous fight to construct socialism. We have relations with the Eritrean fronts and the progressive forces of Ethiopia, and we are working as hard as we can on a settlement of the conflict in Eritrea on a progressive and just basis.

We think that the Sudan, precisely because of its strategic location, can have a great independent and progressive policy instead and in place of the servile alignment with Sadat and imperialism.

Jacques Varin: Can the present government last?

Muhammad El Nur: I think that in the near future the situation in the Sudan will develop favorably, as the government is showing itself to be

* Since this interview and in confirmation of the increase in these contradictions, Numayri, without however subscribing to the economic sanctions taken against Egypt, had to announce a spectacular reversal of his policy with respect to that country.

increasingly incapable of mastering the crisis afflicting the country and of overcoming its contradictions.

Moreover, the mass movement can only continue to develop. The Sudanese Communist Party is concentrating all its efforts on giving it a political perspective and clear action.

8143

CSO: 4800

CARGO TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS PLAGUE TARTUS PORT

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 9 May 79 p 9

[Interview with Tartus Governor Brig Gen 'Ali Zayyud, conducted by Jalal Khayr Bey]

[Text] Tartus. It is the second bride of the coast, the growing province which is filling out bit by bit, which receives at its port the ships of the world and the goods arriving for the country and for neighboring countries.

At one time I lived in Tartus, from 1956 to 1960, and I knew it inch by inch. You could go all around it on bicycle in about half an hour. But now the picture has changed greatly, although the basis remains as it was.

At that time, Tartus was a district subordinate to Latakia. It grew very slowly, which gave you the impression that it was a foreign village lolling on the sea coast. But that was one time, and this is another time.

Two years ago Tartus became a province, and its port began to have a great effect on the growth of the city and its surrounding countryside. Gradually the city began to take on the big city shape which it had begun to enjoy on the map of the Arab world, with an importance increasing year after year.

However, the influence was greatest on its longitudinal expansion, starting north-east of the al-Bariyah quarter and ending at al-Ghamqah quarter, which I had known as a green spot with exquisite gardens, one of which was called Na'urah [water wheel].

Little by little construction activity began swallowing up those water wheels and replacing them with cement cisterns, while latitudinal expansion, i.e. between the sea and the mountains, remained insignificant. It barely even reached the eastern side of the Saint Ilyas quarter and the old electricity plant east of the Shahrazad Cinema, for an obvious reason--the residents could not build on top of the sea, and they could not wipe out the olive groves on the eastern flanks of the mountains near the sea.

Tartus became a province and began to get bigger day by day. With its expansion and the activity of its port, its problems began to get complicated on many

levels, each of which I will deal separately with in a special article--the crisis of transportation from the port to outside the province, tourism, roads within the city and in the rural parts of the province, which is also related to public utilities.

Perhaps the most important item one can begin talking about with respect to this province is to say that it is poor and suffers from many difficulties, the foremost being the port's difficulties and the resulting worries about receiving, transporting or handling goods.

These were some of the thoughts going around in my mind when I met Brig Gen 'Ali Zayyud, governor of Tartus.

At the first session, I said to him, "So much can be said about Tartus, so where do you think we ought to begin? Communications? Utilities? Tourism? The port?"

He said, "We had better begin with the port question, because many worries result from it. Not because it is a worry in itself, but because our concerns begin once the goods arrive. Right now the port of Tartus is a very good one, and in the future it will be one of the best ports on the Mediterranean. Right now it can handle 22 docked ships, and its production capacity is 4 billion tons.

"One of the first things concerning us in this respect is the crisis of vehicles to transport the goods. It is a daily crisis. What is its solution? We have encouraged the private sector to keep its vehicles here instead of letting them go to Lebanon. However, we are running up against the crisis itself because of the price of transportation or of a single shipment, and the drivers' ambiguous dealings with the organizations whose goods reach the port. For this reason you find many goods for sister countries thrown in the road without any vehicles to transport them. Furthermore, the outstanding feature here does not lie in the private trucks' avoiding working for us, but in the fact that time is a basic factor. Because, when you delay moving your goods until two o'clock, you will not find a single truck to transport them for you, for most of the drivers here won't work after noon, preferring to rest."

[Question] So is the pressure on Tartus Port greater than that on Latakia?

[Answer] In general, we have here public sector goods and some private sector goods. At Tartus Port we unload more than Latakia does, but we get only 2 million Syrian pounds in subsidies, while Latakia gets 18 million pounds. Why isn't the sum divided equally between Tartus and Latakia? And why isn't some consideration given to the arrival of goods, subsidies, and unloading capacity?

In addition to what I have mentioned, we have many worries with the public sector with respect to transport, since its directors travel to Europe during the pleasant months, have a good time, get together, and then return! It remains for us to bear the resulting calamity, because the foreigners dominate us in import operations, most of which are during the winter when the rains

are at their peak. Between the transport vehicle crisis and the crisis of arrival during rains, we suffer innumerable, boundless problems. In fact, at times emergencies might take place for which we are responsible, as happened in the sheep issue, whereas the parties concerned ought to bear this responsibility.

[Question] Do you believe that this crisis cannot be solved?

[Answer] No, there is no problem without a solution. In my opinion the most useful thing would be to have a meeting of all those concerned, in order to resolve some essential matters in this respect, for example the following.

1. The domestic transport rate should be raised, for those trucks are actually suffering a loss in transporting public sector goods. Likewise the public sector itself suffers a loss as a result of wastage, a large percentage of which is caused by lack of concern. For example, once the Duraykish plant, while transporting bottled water, lost 450 bottles through wastage. Therefore, raising the rates for transporting each ton will lead to more trucks being available, to carefulness in handling, and to reduced losses, as was the case with the phosphate plant when the rates for transporting one ton to Homs were raised to 25 pounds.
2. Transport fleets should be purchased immediately to end this crisis and its complications. Some organizations, for example Intrometal and Nafco, pay US\$4 million each year in transport rates. Clearly, such a sum could buy a transport fleet which would have an average life of ten years and which would operate continually without creating any crisis at all for any of the two companies' authorities.
3. The entire amount of incoming goods should be assigned and organized into compartments for which a certain authority would be responsible. There would be no objection to a public sector transport company's being this authority.
4. The public sector organizations should give some freedom and flexibility to shipping operations, so that the goods would not remain piled up at our port until the director of the responsible organization comes to approve its shipping. This centralization harms the public sector and its goods and leads to the aggravation of the crisis.
5. There should be coordination between those organizations and the transport director and the port director, so that the capacity of the port and the port traffic control office can be ascertained precisely and scientifically in order for the goods to be sorted, arranged and brought to their various parties. This would end the ships' delay in unloading and the goods' hanging around the port's piers and consequently accruing demurrage charges.

[Question] Assuming that these suggestions are not implemented, can't you solve the crisis by yourselves?

[Answer] The problem is not here, but lies in the shipping and transport operations. It is not in our hands but in the hands of the public sector authorities. If they left the crisis to us, and gave us freedom to handle it, we would solve it internally.

These are some illustrations of the worries and the crisis in shipping goods from the port to the party which requested the goods. I daresay this brief article is not enough to look into all the province's affairs. Therefore we will have more than one meeting with the governor of Tartus about the provincial issues which I mentioned at the beginning of this article.

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